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ABSTRACT 
 
A novel fault integration method is proposed in this paper 
for manufacturing system models given in the form of 
timed colored Petri nets. The faults are assumed to have a 
stochastic nature and are represented in the form of 
transitions firing in stochastic way with known fault 
probabilities in the system model. A novel fault effect 
propagation method was also developed, that can be used 
to compute the probabilities of the possible faulty and 
non-faulty intermediate and final states of the system 
using the probabilities of faults and the occurrence graph. 
 
The faultless and fault containing models were 
implemented in CPNTools both for non-timed and timed 
cases. A software module was also developed for the 
proposed probabilistic fault propagation analysis.  
 
The proposed methods and tools were demonstrated using 
a simple case study.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Manufacturing systems form one of the traditional 
application fields of modeling and analysis of discrete 
event systems (Cassandras and Lafortune 1999). 
Important control related tasks, such as fault modeling, 
detection and diagnosis, dynamic analysis, scheduling, 
etc. are solved using their discrete event dynamic model in 
the form of Petri nets (Zhou and Venkatesh 1999). Driven 
by the emergence of advanced Petri net models and 
diagnostic tools based thereon, this field is fast developing 
(see e.g. (Zaytoon and Lafortune, 2013) for a recent 
overview).  
 
Qualitative model based diagnostic methods – where the 
Petri-net based methods also belong – have been very 
popular in the area of fault detection and diagnosis 
(Venkatasubramanian et al. 2003) because they offer a 
systematic use of engineering knowledge about the 
process to be diagnosed. These methods can be classified 
based on the way how they describe the discrete dynamic 
models and their faults, and how they follow the effect of 
faults during the operation of the system. Majority of the 
Petri net based fault detection and diagnosis methods use 
deterministic models, and describe the faults by hidden 
(unobservable) transitions (see e.g. (Dotoli et al. 2009) or 
Cabasino et al. 2011). However, faults often occur in 
practice in a stochastic way. Therefore, the aim of this 
work is to propose a stochastic fault modeling 
methodology within the Petri net approach, and to develop 
a fault propagation algorithm based thereon.  
 
BASIC NOTIONS  
 
The most important concepts are summarized here for the 
modeling and analysis of manufacturing systems using 
colored Petri nets (CP-nets) and their occurrence graph. 
 
Timed Colored Petri Net Models 
 
CP-nets combine the modeling advantages coming from 
Petri nets and compactness of the functional programming 
language Standard ML (Jensen et al. 2007). The CP-nets 
clearly enable both the mathematical and the graph 
representation of a manufacturing system to be modeled, 
where the signals of the system have discrete range space 
and time is also discrete (Fanti and Seatzu 2008). 
 
Based on the formal definition of CP-nets (see details in 
(Jensen 1997)) the following special choices were used in 
modeling the faultless and faulty operation of a 
manufacturing process. 
- Places refer to the operating units or their states in the 
modeled system. 
- Transitions correspond to the performed 
manufacturing steps.  
- Tokens are associated to work pieces and their colors 
are used to identify work pieces, to describe the 
operation to be performed on them or to describe the 
state of a technological element.  
- Firing time of the transitions Some transitions are 
fired instantaneously, but the processing time of a 
manufacturing step is associated to most of the 
transitions.  
- Guard functions If a manufacturing step has a fault 
with probabilistic nature associated to it, then its guard 
function is used to describe both its faulty and faultless 
operation together with the arc functions of the arcs 
adjacent to it. 
Occurrence graph 
 
The basic idea of the occurrence graph is to construct a 
graph which contains all of the reachable markings from a 
given initial one. The occurrence graph of a timed 
stochastic CP-net can be obtained in a similar way.  
 
If two or more transitions or one transition with different 
tokens are enabled in a given state of the CP-net at the 
same time, then a branch appears on the occurrence graph. 
These firings can be in conflict or in concurrency. In our 
case, another reason for branching in the occurrence graph 
is the presence of fault during the firing of a transition 
when the consequence of firing, i.e. the faultless or faulty 
state evolves randomly. 
 
MODELLING OF FAULT EVENTS AND 
INVESTIGATION OF FAULT PROPAGATION 
 
The aim of this section is to show how the faults can be 
integrated into a CP-net model of a manufacturing system 
and how the probability of an occurring system state can 
be computed based on the occurrence graph of the CP-net 
model.  
 
Fault Modeling 
 
Assume that a fault or a set of faults may occur at a certain 
operational step during the operation of a manufacturing 
system. Let the occurring of these faults be mutually 
exclusive. Based on technological experience, let the 
probability of the occurring of faults is known. 
 
The fault caused probabilistic nature of a transition t 
associated to a processing step can be modeled in a CP-net 
in such a way, that a fault function is built into the guard 
function of the transition t. This fault function returns the 
logical value true or false with predefined probability, and 
the token values of the adjacent consequence places of 
transition t can be controlled by this logical value. This 
type of transition firing is called a stochastically fired 
transition. 
 
The arc expression functions of arcs starting from 
transition t control the consequences: either a token is put 
to the place representing the normal mode or it appears on 
one of the other places that correspond to the occurrence 
of a fault. The type of the occurring fault can be encoded 
into the color of the token. The occurring of more than 
two but mutually exclusive faults can be modeled in a 
similar way. 
 
By using this method, faults can be integrated into the 
model describing the faultless operation of the system in 
such a way that the size and complexity of the net does 
not grow significantly. In our previous paper (Gerzson et 
al. 2012) 11 different faults were integrated into the 
faultless system model using this method and the resulting 
model was used for diagnostic investigations. 
 
This modeling method for integration of faults can also be 
used when the color of tokens refer to different work 
pieces or to other manufacturing characteristics as it is 
shown in our case study below. 
 
Fault Propagation: The Occurrence Probability of the 
System States 
 
Although the faults occur randomly during the operation 
of a manufacturing system, the probability of their 
occurrence can be determined based on observed data. 
Having these data, it is worth investigating their effect on 
the probability of both the normal and the faulty system 
states. Here we assume, that if more than one fault happen 
during the operation of the technological system, they are 
independent of each other.  
 
The occurrence graph can be used for this analysis that is 
generated from a given initial state of a CP-net model 
containing also the faulty events. Here we assume that the 
occurrence graph belonging to a given initial state of a 
CP-net model is finite and acyclic. The occurrence graphs 
of Petri nets modeling manufacturing systems fulfill this 
assumption in general, therefore the following 
considerations can be applied in a wide problem class. 
 
First we consider the occurrence graph belonging to a 
given initial state of a CP-net that describes the normal, 
i.e. faultless operation of the modeled system. We add arc 
weight to the arcs of occurrence graph as follows: 
1. Let the arc weight be equal to 1 if only one arc starts 
from a node of the occurrence graph, that is, the new 
system state follows from the previous one 
unambiguously. 
2. If more than one edge start from a node, then there is a 
branch on the occurrence graph at this node, thus the 
system can get to several distinct states from the given 
state. The branching must have a technological reason 
caused by a conflict situation. 
In conflict situation mutually exclusive firings 
resulting in different consequences are enabled in a 
given system state, and let all of their occurring 
probability be known and let the sum of these 
probabilities be equal to 1. Based on technological 
information the probability of each consequence can 
be determined, but for the general uninformed case it 
can also be assumed that they have the same 
probability. Assign these probability values as arc 
weights to the arcs of occurrence graph. 
 
Next, consider the CP-net of a manufacturing system but 
now integrate the possible faults into the model as it was 
described previously. In this case new branches will 
appear on the occurrence graph belonging to the same 
initial state of the system beside the branches with 
technological reason. The reasons of these new branches 
are the occurring of faults. Assume that at the firing of an 
operational step t in the manufacturing system one or 
more faults can occur besides of normal termination. If 
two or more faults are possible let these be mutually 
exclusive. Denote these fault events by f1, f2, ..., fk and let 
their probabilities be P1, P2, ..., Pk, respectively. It means 
that while only one arc leads from the given node to the 
next node representing the occurring of transition t in the 
occurrence graph of the faultless model, at the same node 
k+1 arcs will appear in the occurrence graph of the fault 
containing model corresponding to the normal event 
(normal termination of transition t) and to the k fault 
events. The probability of the normal event of transition t 
is equal to 1-(P1+...+Pk). Assign the probability values P1, 
P2, ..., Pk and 1-( P1+...+Pk) to the corresponding arcs as 
arc weights on the occurrence graph. The followings are 
true for the arc weights. 
1. The arc weight is equal to 1 if only one arc starts from 
a node. 
2. The sum of arc weights is equal to 1 if two or more 
arcs start from a node. 
 
Then the occurrence probability of the system states can 
be determined as follows. Consider a node v on the 
occurrence graph. 
1. If from node v0 representing the initial state only one 
path leads to node v then the arc weights have to be 
multiplied along this path. 
2. If there are two or more paths from node v0 to node v 
then multiply the arc weights along each path and sum 
up these products. 
 
These calculated values define the probability of the nodes 
of occurrence graph where the nodes represent the 
markings (token distributions) in the net, i.e. these values 
give the occurrence probability of system states. 
 
In that case when the consecutive faults are not 
independent of each other, the conditional probability 
values have to be assigned to the arc of occurrence graph 
and the occurrence possibility of the system state can be 
determined using the same method. 
 
A SIMPLE CASE STUDY 
 
The aim of this section is to illustrate the use of the 
proposed methods for modeling and analysis of a simple 
manufacturing process using CP-nets and their occurrence 
graph.  
 
The software package CPNTools (CPNTools) was used 
for implementing the model of the manufacturing system 
in the form of timed CP-nets with stochastic behavior and 
for the occurrence graph generation. An additional 
software module called OGAnalyzer (Leitold et al. 2013) 
was used to perform the probability calculations. 
 
The Manufacturing System 
 
The investigated simple manufacturing system contains 
two manufacturing lines and a robot. The scheme of the 
system can be seen in Fig. 1. 
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Figures 1: The Manufacturing System 
 
The work pieces to be processed appear on the input 
bench IN. The task of the robot is to put them to the 
appropriate input bench of a manufacturing line M1_IN or 
M2_IN according to operational instructions. Assume that 
the two manufacturing lines perform different processing 
steps on the work pieces. When the manufacturing process 
is over, the work piece appears on the output bench of the 
line, i.e. either on M1_OUT or on M2_OUT. The task of 
robot is to put the work piece either to input bench of the 
other manufacturing line or to the output bench of the 
manufacturing line (OUT) according to operational 
instruction. Assume that only a single fault can occur 
during the manufacturing process, when the identification 
label of the work piece can get damaged. Then work 
pieces with unreadable label get into a separate container 
(FAULTY). A detailed description of the system 
operation can be found in (Leitold et al. 2013). 
 
The Petri net of the described manufacturing system 
consist of the following elements. Places and tokens on 
them give the number and type of work pieces on input 
and output benches. Another place refers to the status of 
the robot: if there is a token on it then the robot is 
available. Places describe the state of input and output 
benches of lines, and token on places refer to the fact that 
the transfer process is under way. A transition refers to the 
manufacturing processes, and further transitions refer to 
the start and the end of transfer processes. The color of 
tokens contains a work piece identifier and the code of 
manufacturing process(es) to be carried out. The guard 
function assigned to a transition of a manufacturing step 
generates the fault randomly with a user defined 
probability. In case of timed simulation of the 
manufacturing system different time units are assigned to 
the transitions appearing as transition inscriptions on the 
net. A part of the CPN model of the system can be seen in 
Figure 2. 
 
Analysis based on the occurrence graph 
 
For the illustration of the generation and analysis of the 
occurrence graph, let us have the following marking after 
the generation of work pieces: 
 Figures 3: The Reachability Graph of Non-timed Case in OGAnalyzer 
 
 
Figure 2: Part of CPN Model of a Manufacturing System 
 
 There are two tokens (1'(1,m2), 1'(2,m12)) on place IN 
representing two work pieces to be processed the first 
on Line 2, the second first on Line 1, then on Line 2; 
 There is a token (1'p) on place Robot denoting the 
robot is ready to work; 
 The tokens (1'm1++ 1'm2) on input (Tin_empty) and 
output places (Tout_empty) of manufacturing lines 
indicate the emptiness of input and output places. 
This token distribution is used as initial marking for the 
investigations of CP-net model both in normal and in 
faulty modes. We investigated the model with non-timed 
and timed transitions. The detailed description of the 
investigations and the resulted occurrence graphs can be 
found in (Leitold et al. 2013). It is important to note that 
the occurrence graph is acyclic as a consequence of the 
identification of work pieces. 
 
Because of the small number of work pieces, the resulted 
occurrence graphs are relatively simple, and the analysis 
of nodes can be done manually. Thus it is easy to find the 
terminal nodes referring to the normal faultless 
termination of the process, and those terminal nodes 
where the manufacturing of either of the pieces or of both 
of them ends with fault. If the number of pieces becomes 
larger the size of the occurrence graph grows 
exponentially. 
 
Probabilistic Analysis of Occurrence Graph using the 
OGAnalyzer 
 
Unfortunately, CPNTools cannot use the information 
about the probability of faults at the generation of 
occurrence graph. However, assigning this value to the 
appropriate edges of the occurrence graph, the probability 
of each node on the occurrence graph, i.e. of each system 
state can be determined. To calculate the probabilities, a 
software module called OGAnalyzer has been developed 
(Leitold et al. 2013). 
 
Non-timed case. In the non-timed case there are three 
branches on the occurrence graph (see in Fig. 3.) with 
technological reason (nodes 3., 9. and 28.) because the 
robot can choose randomly between the transferring of the 
two work pieces. The value of arc weights assigned to arcs 
starting from these nodes are 0.5 - 0.5. The reason of all 
the other branches is the possible occurrence of faults. The 
arc weights of the other branches are calculated by the 
pre-defined fault probabilities. In case of manufacturing 
line 1, the arc weight belonging to fault occurring is equal 
to 0.3, while in case of normal operational mode it is 0.7. 
In case of line 2 these values are 0.1 (faulty case) and 0.9 
(normal case). There are 6 terminal nodes on the 
occurrence graph. 
The probability of nodes, that is the probability of system 
states, can also be calculated using the above described 
method.  
 
Let node 57 be considered. This node refers to the 
situation when the manufacturing of work piece labeled 
by m2 is completed without fault but the label of the other 
work piece m12 gets damaged during the processing on 
line 2 and this work piece gets into the waste product 
container. 
There are three different routes through the branches 
leading to node 57 caused by technological reasons. 
Multiplying the arc weights along these routes the 
summing these products the probability of this node is 
equal to 0.07. The probability of the normal termination of 
the manufacturing process (node 62), i.e. the 
manufacturing of both work pieces completed without any 
fault can be calculated in a similar way and it is equal to 
0.56. 
 
The timed case. Using the timing values i.e. in timed case, 
the occurrence graph becomes a tree with 12 terminal 
nodes. These 12 nodes refer to 6 different process 
terminations and the difference between the pairs is 
processing time. Because of timing, only one branch has 
technological reason and the leaving arcs have the same 
probability. All the other branches are caused by faults, 
and the arc weights can be determined similarly to the 
non-timed case. Because of the tree structure there is only 
one route to all nodes from the root, and the probability of 
nodes can be calculated by multiplying the arc weighs 
along the routes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A novel occurrence graph analysis procedure for discrete 
event systems described by timed colored Petri nets was 
proposed in this paper for model-based diagnostic 
purposes. The faults are assumed to have a stochastic 
nature and were represented in the form of stochastic 
transitions with known fault probabilities in the system 
model that became a timed colored Petri net with 
stochastic behavior. The color of tokens representing the 
work pieces were used to distinguish them and to assign a 
label of the processes to be carried out. The arc 
inscriptions and the built-in probability function were used 
for the fault integration. 
 
A novel fault effect propagation method was also 
developed, that can be used to compute the probabilities 
of the possible faulty and non-faulty final states of the 
system using the probabilities of faults and the occurrence 
graph. This graph was also used for the behavioral 
analysis of the model. A special software module, called 
OGAnalyzer was also developed for the handling of the 
probabilities on the occurrence graph and for calculating 
the occurrence possibility of system states. 
 
The proposed methods and tools were illustrated using a 
simple case study. 
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